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Abstract
We present a semi-endogenous model of regional growth and devel-
opment without scale eﬀects. In this model of a small developing region
the world growth rate of technical progress is given. Regional growth is
driven by technological change induced by imitation. Imitation is deter-
mined by positive externalities from international trade. Regional factor
endowments consist of immobile land and human capital which is perfectly
mobile between regions. In order to study the endogenous formation of re-
gions we introduce a second region and analyze a non symmetric decrease
in international transaction costs. We ﬁnd agglomeration in the region
with better access to international markets, while the less favored region
will realize a drop in income and technological capability. Two reactions
can be identiﬁed. 1. For given resource endowments, the technological
imitation process determines the ﬁnal relative technological steady state
positions. 2. Migration between the regions endogenously determines the
ﬁnal resource endowments of the regions. When reaching the no migra-
tion equilibrium, the relative development position, the population size
and density of the region, as well as comparative advantages are endoge-
nously determined.
Keywords: semi-endogenous growth, economic development, international
trade, agglomeration, regional growth,




11I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last decade there was a strong revival of regional economics, initiated
by a paper series by Krugman (1991a, 1991b, 1993). The new discussion was
motivated by new theoretical tools which allow for more tractable modelling.
This ”new economic geography” has emerged as one of the most exciting areas
of contemporary economics.
A major stream of regional economics explains the emerging of core pe-
riphery pattern through transportation costs and economies of scale (Krugman,
1991a, 1991b), Krugman and Venables, (1995)). Within a framework of monop-
olistic competition and scale economies manufactures production will concen-
trate close to a large market and the market will be large where manufactures
production is concentrated. Being close to a large consumer market is the main
reason that keeps production in cities.
According to a second stream in the literature the focus for explaining loca-
tions of ﬁrms in large cities is not interregional transportation costs and closeness
to the market, but closeness to technologies and to a pool of human capital and
high skilled labor. The advantage of urban areas is given by the density of
people, and hence the concentration of human capital and technologies. Infor-
mational spillovers lead to more eﬃcient production for clustered ﬁrms than for
isolated producers. These approaches combine ideas from the ”new geography”
with contributions from ”endogenous growth theory”. Endogenous growth the-
ory emphasizes the importance of human capital accumulation (Lucas 1988)
and knowledge spillovers (Romer 1986) in economic development. This non-
separability of growth and urbanization has lead to a ﬁeld of literature which
stresses the interaction of geography, agglomeration and endogenous growth of a
region, such as Eaton and Eckstein (1997). Further, In a model with centripetal
forces Englmann and Walz (1995) and Walz (1996) show that linkages between
intermediate and ﬁnal good producers can lead to a clustering of production
and innovation activities in one region. Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 2001) as
well as Baldwin and Forslid (1997) illustrate that clustering also happens when
consumers love variety of not perfectly tradeable consumer goods. Others, as
Rivera-Batiz (1988) and Fujita and Thisse (2002,Ch.11) explain agglomeration
in a framework based on increasing returns to scale. The link to trade within
this concept is drawn by Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002), or Baldwin, Martin
and Ottaviano (2001) or Baldwin and Martin (2003).
While the merger of ”new geography” and ”endogenous growth” with mo-
nopolistic competition and the invention of new technologies rather explains
phenomenons in industrialized countries, we concentrate on LDC’s. Backward
regions obtain technological advantages not by innovating but imitating. Focus-
ing on imitation allows for a more simple modelling, since we can substitute the
innovation sector by a simpliﬁed imitation process. We also identify trade as a
main transmission channel for technologies. Especially for LDC’s trade is sug-
gested to be the decisive link for an access to new technologies. Following ideas
of trade based growth models tracing back to Grossman and Helpman (1990,
1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Young (1991), we develop a model
2in which endogenous growth and agglomeration is generated by external eﬀects
induced by imports. In contrast to the endogenous growth models, we suggest a
mechanics which is more close to the semi-endogenous growth literature (Jones
(1995) and Young (1998)). The endowment of a region or simply its size has
no impact on the long run growth rate of income, but only on the regions rela-
tive level. We denote this level ”relative technology position” (relatively to the
technological leaders).
In what follows, we provide a simple framework to analyze the interaction
between trade, development and agglomeration in regions of LDCs. After de-
scribing a single region we start with a thought experiment where a country
consists of two regions which are originally identical. Factor endowments in the
two regions are immobile land and perfectly mobile human capital. We deﬁne
international transaction costs as a general concept which includes international
transport costs as well as explicit and implicit barriers of trade. The central
questions we would like to look at are: What determines the endogenous pop-
ulation size and density as well as the ﬁnal success of a region? Is trade policy
important for regional development? Does an agglomerating region develop on
expense of the developing opportunities of other regions? What are the com-
parative advantages of these endogenously formed regions?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model for a
single backward region, section 3 adds a second region to deﬁne a developing
country where labor is mobile between the regions, and section 4 analyzes the
endogenous formation of regions if international transaction costs non symmet-
rically change in the regions and human capital can migrate between regions.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model of a Single Region
The economy considered is a small region i integrated into world markets. The
region is located in a developing country and characterized by a technological
gap towards the leading industrialized world. Factors of production are land Li
and skilled labor or human capital Hi.T h eﬁnal output sector uses both, land
and labor to produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good Xi.T h eﬁn a lg o o di su s e df o r
domestic consumption and exports. The production of the ﬁnal consumption






where Ai is the regional level of technology. The developing region does not cre-
ate new knowledge, but acquires technologies by decoding and imitating foreign
designs from the technological leaders. The process of decoding technologies is
driven by positive externalities from international integration.
The ability to increase the domestic stock of technological knowledge is pos-
itively related to the technological gap between the backward region and the
industrialized world. If the domestic stock of technology is low, it is relatively
3easy to increase the technology stock by adopting foreign designs. However this
process becomes increasingly diﬃcult as the technological gap diminishes. This
in fact draws back to the well-known Veblen-Gerschenkron-Hypothesis1.A sw e
focus on underdeveloped regions we explicitly exclude the case of innovations in
this backward region. Let Imi denote imports and V the stock of knowledge of
the technological leaders, we describe the increase of domestic technologies by
imitation activities as
˙ Ai(t)=Imi(t) θi(t), (2)
where t denotes time,




denotes the relative technological position of the region ωi(t), and respectively
the technological gap θi(t) between the developing region and the industrialized
world.
In order to determine the imports the demand side has to be considered. The
household consumes domestic goods Ci and foreign goods Imi. For simplicity






As we do not consider international borrowing or lending, the representative
consumers budget constraint is given by Xi = Ci+(1+τi)piImi,w h e r eτi is an
ad valorem parameter for international transaction costs on imports and pi is
the relative price of imports in terms of the domestic ﬁnal product. Due to the
small country assumption, pi is exogenously given and supposed to be constant.





Using (2), (4), and (1) we obtain a diﬀerential equation determining the








While domestic technological knowledge is endogenous for the region the stock
of knowledge of the technological leaders V (t) i sa s s u m e dt og r o ww i t hag i v e n
constant rate n:
˙ V (t)=nV (t) (6)
1See Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron (1963).
4Diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to time and using (5) and (6) leads to a non
linear diﬀerential equation










For a given initial value ωi(0), the solution of this logistic equation gives the










This solution implies the possibility of two diﬀerent dynamic regimes for the time
path of technological upgrading depending on the value of Ψi. In the following
we consider only the case that the region will grow on a path of convergence
















As can be seen from (9) the steady state ω∗
i deﬁnes the ﬁnal development
position of the region. Even in the long run a ﬁnal gap n/Ψi will remain. An
imitating region can never fully close the technological gap.
Therefore the ﬁnal position of the region is determined by the degree of
economic integration and the factor endowments. A reduction of τi will increase
the speed of technological convergence as well as the ﬁnal technological position.
With a larger endowment the imitation, driven by positive externalities from
trade, accelerates and the ﬁnal position of the region improves
3 Two Regions in a Country
To analyze interregional migration and agglomeration we need to look at more
than one region. We consider a country with two regions. Both regions have a
2For Ψi ≤ n the ratio of technological knowledge ωi(t) will decrease to zero, i.e. the region
cannot close the technological gap and will diverge. For Ψi >nthe ratio of technological
knowledge ωi(t) will increase and the region will follow a process of technological upgrading.
3For given values of pi, β, Li and Hi the condition Ψi >nc a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so f





i > (1 + τi).
Therefore, the process of transition will be successful, if the region meets these requiements










5local immobile factor (land) and a perfectly mobile factor, human capital. Both
regions (i =1 ,2) originally have identical stocks of endowments and identical
technologies. The countries total endowment H is normalized at unity and the
allocation to the two regions is given by H1,H 2
H =1=H1 + H2. (10)
As there is an interaction of the development position and human capital mi-
gration, two conditions, the ﬁnal development condition and the labor market
equilibrium condition (no migration condition) have to be considered next.
Relative Regional Development: From equation (9) in the previous
section we know that the steady state position of each region is ω∗
i,t h er e l a t i v e















We refer to this condition as the ﬁnal development condition which identiﬁes
the relative technological position of a region in steady state. In general, this
relative ﬁnal position depends on all parameters of Ψ1 and Ψ2 (see (8)) and
in particular on the allocation of H in the two regions. The ﬁnal development
curve ΩD can be drawn in a Ω − H1−diagram (Figure 1). Since originally we
have identical regions (H1 = H2), ΩD is 1 in the original position point A. In
the neighborhood of this starting point and by using the resource constraint








Regional Migration and Perfect Labor Market: The central idea of
the endogenous determination of regions is the issue of an endogenous allocation
of mobile factors of production to the diﬀerent regions. Mobile human capital
is mobile and will migrate into locations with higher wage. As long as a region
is more attractive for human capital, additional human capital will migrate into
this region. Equilibrium in this process of regional development will be reached










Figure 1: Orginal Steady State, Identical Regions
regions. To determine the allocation of human capital, we assume that human
capital is perfectly mobile and allocates between the regions according to the




At every time human capital migrates instantaneously between the regions, such

















We refer to this condition as the no migration-condition. Under the assump-
tion of originally identical regions and by using the countries human capital







7As we assume perfect competion in the ﬁnal goods market, factor prices (and wages alike)
are determined by their marginal productivity wHi = AiLα
i H−α




7The no migration-curve can also be drawn into the Ω − H1−diagram. In this
diagram the slope of the ﬁnal development condition is smaller than the slope
of the no migration condition. Appendix 4 shows that the respective condition
is not restrictive.
4 Endogenous Formation of Regions
For originally identical regions we analyze the eﬀects of an outward looking pol-
i c yi nr e g i o no n e . E v e ni ft a r i ﬀs do not belong to the instruments of regional
policy, many bureaucratic instruments belong to region speciﬁc non-tariﬀ trade
barriers. If a region decreases international transaction and information costs,
it may be able to generate a decisive advantage in competitiveness over other
regions. Another situation to consider is the case that a decrease in interna-
tional transaction costs aﬀects mainly region 1, while region 2 cannot realize
the full eﬀect. This non symmetric decrease of international transactions cost
c a nb et r a n s l a t e di nt h em o d e lb ydτ1 < 0. The result is an upward shift of
the ﬁnal development curve ΩD in ﬁgure 2. In the neighborhood of the origi-
nal equilibrium point A the two regions will move toward the new equilibrium
point B. The change in international transaction costs will trigger two mutually
dependent reactions. First, a change in the relative technological development
of the two regions, and second, a migration process towards the faster growing
region. As immigration of human capital and faster growth of technological
abilities are mutually favorable, an agglomerating process is initiated.
In order to discuss the endogenous formation of regions we look at the eﬀects
on central economic characteristics of the regions:
Population Size, Density and Agglomeration: For the system of two
stationarity conditions (11) and (13) as well as the resource constraint (10) we














The population of region 1 will grow up to an endogenously determined size,
while region 2 will face brain drain and shrink. Lower international transaction
costs and a better access to international technologies in region 1 will increase
technology growth and trigger an advantage for the region which eventually
leads to a long run diﬀerence between the originally identical locations. Faster
imitation increases productivity growth and a wage gap between the regions
opens. As human capital is perfectly mobile between the two regions, human
capital instantaneously migrates to the high productivity high wage region. Im-
migration and the resulting additional technological growth will mutually drive









Figure 2: Endgenous Formation of Regions
through ”immigration-additional productivity growth and immigration” takes
place. As one region absorbs the human capital of the other region to feed the
agglomeration process, the success of one region is driven on expense of the
other region. The described accelerating process will endogenously terminate.
When imitation becomes more diﬃcult, once the region approaches more so-
phisticated technologies, immigrating human capital (decreasing marginal pro-
ductivity) will eventually drive down wage growth in the agglomerating region.
At the same time emigrating human capital will drive up marginal productivity
in the less favored region. Eventually all incentives for additional migration and
labor market adjustment disappear between the two regions. A new equilibrium
allocation of mobile human capital is reached.
Income: The second central question to look at, is the development of
income in both regions as well as the total income of the country. If we adjust
the domestic technology level for the level of the technological leader (V )w e











Taking account of the budget constraint (10) equilibrium income reactions in




























































Income is driven by three channels, a direct improvement of the technology h1i
and two eﬀects from interregional migration h2i and h3i.I m m i g r a t i n g h u m a n
capital drives up the relative level of technology and increases the regions factor
endowment and production capacity. Both migration eﬀects are mutually rein-
forcing. They are positive in one region and negative in the other. The total
income eﬀect is
dY ∗ = dY ∗








1 > 0 for identical regions.
Adjusting for the symmetric mutually compensating migration eﬀects in both
regions we are left with the original positive technology shock in region 1. When
the access to international technologies improves at least in one region, imitation
accelerates and a better steady state position can be reached. The country on
average is better oﬀ.
Immobile Factors: While a perfectly integrated labor market will lead










































































The factor price (relative to the technological leader) for land ρi will increase in
the agglomerating region and relatively decrease in the less favored region. This
can be expected, as in the agglomerating region land becomes less abundant than
in less favored regions where human capital has emigrated and the population
density has decreased.
10Comparative advantages: As the described process determines the rela-
tive ﬁnal technological position of the region, technologically driven Riccardian
comparative advantages are directly determined by the technological develop-
ment of the region. But also comparative advantages through Heckscher-Ohlin-
trade is endogenously determined. If the production function for the ﬁnal good
is identiﬁed as Findlay’s foreign exchange productions function9 the link to trade
theory and endogenous determination of comparative advantages is straight for-
ward. According to this concept real output can be multiplied with the given
world market prices. The production function becomes a value function in in-
ternational prices. For a given vector of world market prices and a continuum
of goods, each location fully specializes in the production of one good. Factor
abundance determines the factor intensity in production and hence the particu-
lar industry of specialization. A human capital abundant location will specialize
in a human capital intensive industry. Therefore, the inﬂow of human capital
and the endogenous termination of immigration will also determine the H-O
position of the region. The more human capital ﬂows into the region, the more
human capital intensive will be the domestic output, which also determines
the (H-O) specialized export product. Therefore, the process determines not
only the size and agglomeration of the region, but also comparative advantages
according to neoclassic trade theory.
5 Summary
In this paper we analyze the endogenous formation of regions through the in-
teraction between trade growth and agglomeration. A region in a developing
country is described by a growth model with endogenous imitation for a given
exogenous international process of technological growth. The endogenous im-
itation of the backward region is driven by positive externalities from trade.
The degree of international integration as well as the factor endowment deter-
mines the regions steady state position relative to the technological leaders. We
introduce a decrease in international transaction costs which aﬀects basically
one region. We analyze how this change leads to a formation of diﬀerent re-
gions. Two processes will drive the development in each region: 1. For a given
resource endowment, technological imitation determines the relative regional
development and 2. migration between regions endogenously determines the re-
source endowments of each region. This mutually depended process terminates
once the no migration equilibrium is reached. The no migration equilibrium
endogenously determines the population size and density as well as per capita
income and comparative advantages in a regions. There will be agglomeration
in the region with easy access to international markets, while the less favored
region will realize a relative drop in income and technological capability.
9See Findlay (1973, 1985).
116A p p e n d i x

































































































































































> 0 for identical regions
Appendix 3a: Slope of the no migration curve for identical regions:



































































Appendix 4: Relative slope of the ﬁnal development position and the no
















n − αn<αΨi − αn
n/α < Ψi
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